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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RUSSELL HAS THE STATUTORY CAPACITY NECESSARY 
TO REDEEM PROPERTY FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE BECAUSE 
HE IS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO A JUDGMENT DEBTOR 
Utah's right of redemption statute provides that "[s]ales of real estate under judgments 
of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of sales under 
executions generally." Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 (1993 Supp). Those who may redeem 
property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold separately, include "the following 
persons or their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lien by 
judgment or a mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to 
that on which the property was sold." Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j)(l) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff and Appellee Mark L. Rindlesbach ("Rindlesbach") relies on the Court's 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on June 23, 1995 (the 
"Order") to argue that the "law of the case" doctrine bars Defendant and Appellant Roger T. 
Russell ("Russell") from redeeming two parcels of real property (the "Subject Property") 
purchased by Rindlesbach at a sheriff's sale. The Order states, in pertinent part, that "Russell 
is not a 'Judgment Debtor' as that term is used in Rule 69(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." However, the Order creates no "law of the case" implications because Russell 
does not seek to redeem the Subject Property as a judgment debtor, but as a successor in 
interest to Drew William Hansen ("Drew") and Diana M. Hansen ("Diana"), the judgment 
debtors. Nowhere in his appellate brief does Rindlesbach define "successor in interest to a 
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judgment debtor." Russell submits that the best and most accurate definition of a successor in 
interest to a judgment debtor is "one who has acquired or succeeded to the interest of the 
judgment debtor in the property . . . " Fortv-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East 
Broadway, 135 Ariz. 265, 660 P.2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 1982). Russell succeeded to the 
interest of Drew and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the Subject Property. 
Accordingly, the Order in no way affects Russell's statutory capacity to redeem the Subject 
Property. 
It is critical to note that Rule 69(e)(3) allows only the "judgment debtor" to designate 
the order of parcels at a sheriffs sale, while Rule 69(j) allows the judgment debtor or his 
successor in interest to redeem. The difference in wording reflects the essential distinction 
between the purposes of the two subsections." The "designation of parcels" subsection 
provides the judgment debtor an opportunity to maximize the bid, thus reducing or eliminating 
a deficiency. On the other hand, the redemption subsection allows the party having an interest 
in the property - be it the judgment debtor or a successor in interest - to recover the property 
within the redemptive period. 
Moreover, as Rindlesbach correctly notes, "the 'law of the case' doctrine is employed 
to avoid delay and prevent injustice." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 
42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Employment of the "law of the case" doctrine to the procedural 
setting of this case will not avoid delay and, in fact, will promote injustice. The District 
Court's finding that Russell is not a judgment debtor for purposes of Rule 69(e)(3) has no 
bearing on whether Russell is a judgment debtor for purposes of determining who may redeem 
under Rule 69(j). Indeed, such a finding was neither critical nor necessary to the entry of 
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summary judgment granting the relief sought in Rindlesbach's foreclosure complaint. Russell 
should not be denied the opportunity to prove at trial that he is entitled to redeem the Subject 
Property under Rule 69(j). See Evans v. Stamper, 835 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Wyo. 1992) 
(redemption statutes should be liberally construed in favor of right to redeem following 
foreclosure). 
Rindlesbach argues in his appellate brief, in effect, that successive owners of real 
property do not qualify as successors in interest to a judgment debtor under Rule 69(j). That 
argument is devoid of legal support. Instead, Rindlesbach attempts to discredit Russell's 
reliance on the case of Forty-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 Broadway, 135 Ariz. 
265, 660 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1982), by claiming that Arizona's right of redemption statute is 
broader than Rule 69(j)(l) because it states that property sold subject to redemption may be 
redeemed by the "judgment debtor or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the 
property." Rindlesbach claims that Russell is precluded from redeeming the Subject Property 
as a successor in interest to a judgment debtor because unlike Arizona's right of redemption 
statute, Rule 69(j)(l) does not contain the express language that a judgment debtor or his 
successor in interest "in the whole or any part of the property" may redeem property sold 
subject to redemption. 
Simply put, Russell is a successor in interest to a judgment debtor because he 
succeeded to the interest of Drew and Diana in the Subject Property when he purchased the 
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Subject Property on contract in April 1991.l Indeed, a strong argument can be made that Rule 
69(j)(l) is broader than Arizona's right of redemption statute because persons entitled to 
redeem are not limited to successors in interest of a judgment debtor "in the whole or any part 
of the property." Russell is a successor in interest to a judgment debtor under Rule 69(j) and 
also would qualify under the more specific right of redemption statute in Arizona. 
Accordingly, Russell has the statutory capacity to redeem the Subject Property and should be 
allowed to do so. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO EFFECT ON 
EVAN W. HANSEN'S DEALINGS WITH RUSSELL AS AN AGENT OF 
DREW AND DIANA NOR DOES IT PREVENT RUSSELL 
FROM ASSERTING AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
Rindlesbach claims in his appellate brief that Russell essentially asks this Court to 
repeal the statute of frauds in seeking specific performance of his contract with Evan W. 
Hansen ("Evan") as if the statute of frauds were a rule without exception no matter how 
completely lacking in fraud the transaction may be. Russell respectfully requests the Court to 
prevent Rindlesbach from turning the statute of frauds on its head and using it as a weapon to 
perpetrate a gross injustice against Russell. Indeed, the affidavits of Russell, Dale Hansen 
("Dale"), and Brook Hansen ("Brook"), all show that Evan had sold the Subject Property to 
Russell for the benefit and with the approval of Drew and Diana. There is more than one 
Russell's argument that Rule 69(j)(l) is broader in its application than Arizona's right of redemption 
statute also is supported by Perry v. Safety Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Kansas City, 25 Ariz. App. 443, 544 
P.2d 267 (1976), a case cited by Rindlesbach in his appellate brief in an attempt to minimize the effect of Forty-
Four Hundred East Broadway. Perry indicates that a person does not become a successor in interest to a judgment 
debtor in Arizona unless he or she acquires a properly acknowledged deed in accordance with Arizona statute. See 
id. at 269. In contrast, Utah has no such provision limiting who can be a successor in interest. 
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genuine issue of material fact in this case with respect to Russell's dealings with Evan and his 
purchase of the Subject Property, thus dictating that Russell have his day in court. 
Russell claims that the case of Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), is 
factually similar to that before this Court and defeats Russell's ratification claim. In Bradshaw. 
the plaintiffs and one of eight sibling owners of certain property entered into an oral agreement 
to sell the plaintiffs the property. However, two of the siblings were not notified of the 
agreement at any relevant time and manifested by their actions their disapproval of the 
agreement. Indeed, one of the siblings continually stated his objection to the agreement. Drew 
and Diana in the instant case not only knew of Evan's agreement to sell the Subject Property 
to Russell but, in fact, approved of such sale and did nothing to disaffirm the agreement. 
Russell submits that if the facts of the instant case were before the Utah Supreme Court in 
Bradshaw, the Supreme Court would have found that Drew and Diana ratified Evan's actions: 
"Ratification like original authority need not be express. Any 
conduct which indicates assent by the purported principal to 
become a party to the transaction or which is justifiable only if 
there is ratification is sufficient. Even silence with full knowledge 
of the facts may manifest affirmance and thus operate as a 
ratification. The person with whom the agent dealt will so 
obviously be deceived by assuming the professed agent was 
authorized to act as such, that the principal is under a duty to 
undeceive him. . . . " 
RL at 78 (quoting Moses v. Archie McFarland & Son. 119 Utah 602, 630 P.2d 571, 572-74 
(1951)). 
Rindlesbach also claims that Russell's claim of ratification violates the statute of frauds 
because Evan was not authorized in writing by Drew and Diana to enter into the agreement. 
However, as Rindlesbach well knows, there is a statutory limitation on the harshness of the 
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statute of frauds. In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1995) expressly provides that 
"[njothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to 
compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof." It is well 
settled that "[cjourts of equity, in establishing the doctrine [of part performance], have not, by 
any means, intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only to prevent its being made the 
means of perpetrating a fraud." Price v. Llovd. 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 772 (Utah 1906).2 
Russell's part performance, as presented to the District Court in his affidavit, meets 
each of the standards of sufficient performance necessary for part performance, which are as 
follows: 
First, the oral contract in its terms must be clear and definite; 
second, the acts done in performance of the contract must be 
equally clear and definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance 
on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they 
would not have been performed had the contract not existed, and 
(b) a failure to perform on the part of the promisor would result 
2Rindlesbach relies heavily on "general" rules taken from the Bradshaw case and improperly treats them 
as absolutes. For example, Rindlesbach argues that "[t]he general rule is that one who deals with an agent has the 
responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority despite the agent's representations." Bradshaw, 649 P.2d at 78. 
This general rule, however, is severely tempered by a more recent case, Garland v. Fleischmann. 831 P.2d 107, 
110 (Utah 1992), in which the Utah Supreme Court recognized in no uncertain terms that "[i]t is well established 
in the law that a principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's authority, irrespective 
of whether the principal is disclosed or undisclosed." Id. at 110 (emphasis added). The fact that Evan acted in his 
own name without disclosing the identities of Drew and Diana "does not preclude liability on the part of the 
principal when he is discovered to be such by a third party who has dealt with the agent." Id, Significantly, "[t]his 
is true even though the third person dealing with the agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after 
the bargain was completed." IcL In short, the proposition of law espoused in Garland protects persons such as 
Russell who deal with agents such as Evan who create "such an appearance of things that it causes a third party 
reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to act on behalf of the first person. Walker 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones. 672 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1983). 
Rindlesbach also relies on the general rule that "[w]here the law requires the authority to be given in 
writing, ratification must also generally be in writing." IcL at 79 (emphasis added). However, like other 
transactions which fall under the statute of frauds, the transaction also is subject to escape from the harshness of 
the statute of frauds in accordance with the doctrine of part performance. Part performance of the transaction 
satisfies the very reason for which the statute of frauds applies at all, which is to prevent a fraud from being 
perpetrated. 
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in fraud or on the performer who relied, since damages would be 
inadequate. 
Martin v. ScholL 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). 
The terms of the agreement between Russell and Evan were definite and certain, and 
the proposed written document between the parties, although never signed, clearly evidenced 
the intent of the parties to consummate the transaction. Russell and Evan specifically described 
the real property which Russell agreed to purchase. Evan agreed to sell the Subject Property to 
Russell for $115,000 00, and their agreement required Russell to make monthl) paj ments of 
$1,000.00 for application to the loan. Russell did in fact make over two years' worth of 
monthly payments under the agreement and also paid $8,500.00 in cash and $7,688.92 to 
bring property taxes current as required by the agreement. Although Russell has not paid the 
entire purchase price, Russell has paid the full redemption amount into court and has averred 
his ability, readiness and willingness to fulfill all of his agreed obligations. These facts alone 
show that the agreement is certain and definite enough to be specifically enforceable. "[T]he 
proper application of [the rule that the essential terms of the contract must be definite] is as a 
shield to protect from injustice, and not as a weapon with which to work . "' Tanner 
v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980). Even though the parties' agreement was never 
reduced to a signed document, its essential terms have never been disputed. 
I ill ther Russell's acts - including payment of about $40,000.00, possession of the 
Subject Property, maintenance and improvement of it, and even his rental of pasturage to 
others - were clear and definite. Moreover, Russell acted in reliance on the agreement and 
absolutely would not have performed as he did had the agreement not existed. Finally, Evan's 
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failure to perform the agreement would have resulted in fraud on Russell because (a) Russell 
relied to his detriment on Evan's promise to sell the Subject Property and (b) damages would 
not compensate Russell for loss of the Subject Property as a unique asset. 
It is understood that "[rjeliance may be made in innumerable ways all of which could 
refer exclusively to the contract." Id In this case, Russell had the option to keep his horses 
elsewhere, but chose to keep his horses on the Subject Property because he owned it. 
Moreover, Russell had no reason to improve the Subject Property except that he owned the 
Subject Property and wanted to improve its utility and appearance. Further, both Russell and 
Evan acknowledged that payment of $1,000.00 per month for rent would be absurd. Finally, 
Russell allowed Evan and his wife to stay on the Subject Property by conveying a life estate 
interest to Evan, with Russell retaining the fee simple interest in the Subject Property. Because 
all of these acts exclusively refer to the purchase agreement, Russell was the owner of the 
Subject Property and not merely Evan's tenant. 
Like Rindlesbach's reliance on Bradshaw. Rindlesbach's reliance on the cases of 
Williams v. Singleton. 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), and Coombs v. Ouzounian. 24 Utah 2d 39, 
465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970), is equally misplaced because any violation of the statute of frauds 
is satisfied by the doctrine of part performance. In Williams and Coombs, the court recognized 
that there is no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. If any such violation existed in 
the case at bar, then the violation was cured by Russell's part performance of his agreement 
with Evan. In short, there are numerous "equities taking the case under consideration out of 
the statute of frauds." Lee v. Polvhrones, 195 P. 201, 202 (Utah 1921). Russell's agreement 
with Evan should be enforced exactly the way Drew and Diana intended. 
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Rindlesbach argues that the case of George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos Revocable 
Trust v. Fisher, 907 I\2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), relied on by Russell in his appellate 
brief, is far different from the instant case. Russell disagrees. Fisher specifically involved a 
statute of frauds issue resolved in favor of part performance of an oral modification to a 
written escrow agreement, I he pai t performance of the parties perfot: ming i n idei the oral 
modification in Fisher is strikingly similar to that of Russell's part performance in the instant 
case. In particular, the parties in Fisher installed sprinkling systems, cleaned and graded the 
land, and i»^ "f|iV'ii p<m<K ^iiniUrh Ru^ <. M took possession of tlit„J" Suhiect Property ami 
improved it by doing such things as mending fences and cleaning up and maintaining the 
Subject Property. Further, the terms of the agreement between Russell and Evan are much 
more clear and definite than the oral term modifying the underlying written agreement in 
Fisher. In Fisher, the payment term was modified simply to require payment under the 
agreement "until requested " In contrast, as shown above, the terms of the agreemei it bet w een 
Russell and Evan are abundantly clear and definite and warrant specific enforcement. 
It is also extremely important to note that the oral modification of the underlying 
written agreen ,i Jrisher was binding on both the husband and the wife, the original sellers 
of the property in Fisher, even though there is no indication in Fisher that the wife gave 
written authorization to her husband as her agent to modify orall) (1le written agreement. 
Indeed, this Court expressly affirmed the trial court's finding that the wife "knew of the 
modification and acquiesced in the agreement to postpone payments." IdL In short, the doctrine 
of part performance saved the oral understanding klvvci ii lln, lurlios from \ iolal miz lite viatiiic 
of frauds either directly or indirectly. The same is true in the instant case. 
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Russell's affidavit opposing summary judgment described his part performance in 
detail. At the very least, his affidavit created a material issue of fact which should have been 
reserved for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Russell requests the following relief: 
1. That the District Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Defendant Russell be reversed; 
2. That the District Court's Judgment and Decree quieting title in the Subject 
Property in favor of Rindlesbach and against Russell be reversed; and 
3. That the action be remanded to the District Court, where Russell may be 
accorded a trial on the merits. 
DATED this ? W day of December 1996. 
JARDINE LINEBAUGH & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
By: ^ ^ > ^ ' w W * « y 
Williq^n (7. Marsden 
John N. Brems 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee 
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